Kristin Andrews (York University)
Title: Field and Lab: Different methods, different questions, and different answers
Abstract: While animal minds are typically studied in controlled experimental situations such as a laboratory, zoo, or sanctuary, some cognition research is done with wild animals in a messier natural environment. The benefits and problems associated with each method have been much discussed. Laboratory settings allow for better controls for experiments, but lack ecological validity. In wild settings, experiments, if performed, have fewer controls, and much of the research is not experimental. However, wild animals enjoy a typical ecological and psychological environment. What hasn’t been discussed as much is what sort of information is better gained in the lab and in the field. Appealing to my notion of folk expertise (Andrews 2009), methods in classical and cognitive ethology, and comparative cognition, I sketch a program that combines lab and field research that we can use to gain a better understanding of animal cognition. The proposed program is a modification of the methods we use with human animals in psychology and anthropology. I appeal to the methods in these fields, and especially in cross-cultural psychology, and apply the lessons learned from these fields to the research we do with other animals. Finally, I show how the current state of research on ape cognition that attempts to compare apes with human children fails to make an adequate comparison given the differences in subject pools and methods used with each group.
Rachael Brown (Macquarie University)
Title: Assessing the prospects of the bottom-up approach to comparative psychology
Abstract: Over the past few decades comparative psychology has been dominated by top-down “trophy hunting” or “all or nothing” approach; the focus being on which animals (if any) have theory of mind, mental time travel and causal reasoning. Recently, an alternative bottom-up approach focused on the basic building blocks of cognition has been put forward as a way to make progress in the field. A key motivation for this approach, which emphasises continuity and gradualism, is the assumption that de novo appearances of cognitive capacities are less likely than the reuse of existing capacities to new functional ends on evolutionary grounds. Here, I consider the justification for this assumption and the extent to which it offers a useful constraint on theorising in comparative psychology.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (CUNY/University of Sydney)
Title: Evolution, Cognition, and Consciousness
Abstract: This talk will look at the evolution of both simple and more complex cognition, considering the overall history of animal life. Where might we find smooth gradients and where might there be more definite transitions (if not jumps)? What is the likely role of parallel evolution, as opposed to single origins for important traits? I’ll also disengangle questions about the cognitive role of consciousness from questions about qualia and subjective experience in the broadest sense. I’ll offer sketches of the evolutionary history of both – subjective experience and consciousness.
Russell Gray (Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History/University of Auckland)
Title: Neither a romantic nor a killjoy: some Bayesian thoughts about debates on animal minds.
Abstract: Debates in the study of animal cognition often oscillate between over-hyped claims of "human-like" cognitive abilities and deflationary "killjoy" accounts. In this talk I will argue that studies of cognitive evolution should follow studies of morphological complexity and seek incremental Darwinian accounts rather than postulating miraculous cognitive leaps. Our focus should therefore be on articulating what a theory intermediate cognition would look like, and developing powerful ways of testing specific intermediate cognitive mechanisms, rather than all-or-nothing claims about our pet species possessing some complex “human-like” ability. I will draw on the work of the philosophers Woodward and Sober in outlining some steps towards a Bayesian model comparison approach to animal cognition.
Andrea Griffin (University of Newcastle)
Title: Cognitive mechanisms of innovative problem solving in birds: Findings from a highly successful ecological invader
Abstract: Why do some species have larger brains than others? Do big brains confer greater intelligence? Do some environments select for greater intelligence? These questions underpin efforts to identify species differences in cognition, brains and ecology. Within this context, innovation -the ability to invent new behaviours, or use pre-existing ones in novel circumstances- has attracted increasing research interest in recent years. This surge of interest arose from macro-ecological analyses showing that innovation counts, the number of anecdotal reports of novel foraging behaviours per taxon, is positively correlated in both avian and primate taxa with the relative volume of multimodal integration areas broadly accepted to support higher order cognition. This finding forms the basis of the suggestion that innovation counts may offer a way forward to explore ecological conditions that select for enhanced information processing. We have been studying innovation in a highly successful invader, the common myna, using an experimental cross- and within-species comparative approach since 2010. I will present a body of empirical work that sheds light on the cognitive underpinnings of innovative problem solving in this invasive Passerine.
Dr. Brian Huss (York University)
Title: Type I and Type II Errors in Animal Cognition Research
Abstract: Anthropomorphism is the error of attributing certain characteristics to non-human animals when they do not in fact have those characteristics. Many people who work on animal cognition seem to think that it is an error to be avoided at all costs. One of those costs is likely to be anthropectomy (Gk. anthropos – human, ektomia – to cut out) – the error of denying that animals have certain characteristics when they do in fact have them. In a recently published paper, Kristin Andrews and I argue that (a) there is no reason to think that anthropomorphism is any more egregious than anthropectomy, and (b) the inclination to think otherwise is probably due to a failure to properly understand what is at epistemic stake in choosing the null hypothesis – the hypothesis that defines what counts as a Type I or Type II error. The epistemology of choosing the null hypothesis is discussed in this paper.
Dr. Alex Taylor (University of Auckland)
Title: The signature testing approach to the evolution of intelligence
Abstract: The evolution of intelligence is one of nature’s greatest mysteries. We have little idea how we came to be so clever, or even how our minds actually differ from those of other species. For over 100 years researchers have compared human and animal intelligence in order to gain insight into this area. However, these comparisons have been based on a “success-testing” approach, where researchers simply examine whether an animal can solve a problem or not. This approach has generated a great deal of debate, but little progress, because success-testing is flawed. Just because an animal solves a problem, it does not follow that the animal has used the same cognitive mechanisms as humans to do so. Inspired by Alan Turing’s work on machine intelligence, I will argue we need to adopt a novel “signature-testing” approach to avoid this problem. By searching for the signatures of cognitive mechanisms (their limits, errors and biases) it is possible to demonstrate whether a human and an animal truly think in the same way or not. I will outline how signature-testing can chart the evolution of intelligence and demonstrate its potential for three areas of comparative cognition: causal reasoning, mental time travel and metacognition.
Title: Field and Lab: Different methods, different questions, and different answers
Abstract: While animal minds are typically studied in controlled experimental situations such as a laboratory, zoo, or sanctuary, some cognition research is done with wild animals in a messier natural environment. The benefits and problems associated with each method have been much discussed. Laboratory settings allow for better controls for experiments, but lack ecological validity. In wild settings, experiments, if performed, have fewer controls, and much of the research is not experimental. However, wild animals enjoy a typical ecological and psychological environment. What hasn’t been discussed as much is what sort of information is better gained in the lab and in the field. Appealing to my notion of folk expertise (Andrews 2009), methods in classical and cognitive ethology, and comparative cognition, I sketch a program that combines lab and field research that we can use to gain a better understanding of animal cognition. The proposed program is a modification of the methods we use with human animals in psychology and anthropology. I appeal to the methods in these fields, and especially in cross-cultural psychology, and apply the lessons learned from these fields to the research we do with other animals. Finally, I show how the current state of research on ape cognition that attempts to compare apes with human children fails to make an adequate comparison given the differences in subject pools and methods used with each group.
Rachael Brown (Macquarie University)
Title: Assessing the prospects of the bottom-up approach to comparative psychology
Abstract: Over the past few decades comparative psychology has been dominated by top-down “trophy hunting” or “all or nothing” approach; the focus being on which animals (if any) have theory of mind, mental time travel and causal reasoning. Recently, an alternative bottom-up approach focused on the basic building blocks of cognition has been put forward as a way to make progress in the field. A key motivation for this approach, which emphasises continuity and gradualism, is the assumption that de novo appearances of cognitive capacities are less likely than the reuse of existing capacities to new functional ends on evolutionary grounds. Here, I consider the justification for this assumption and the extent to which it offers a useful constraint on theorising in comparative psychology.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (CUNY/University of Sydney)
Title: Evolution, Cognition, and Consciousness
Abstract: This talk will look at the evolution of both simple and more complex cognition, considering the overall history of animal life. Where might we find smooth gradients and where might there be more definite transitions (if not jumps)? What is the likely role of parallel evolution, as opposed to single origins for important traits? I’ll also disengangle questions about the cognitive role of consciousness from questions about qualia and subjective experience in the broadest sense. I’ll offer sketches of the evolutionary history of both – subjective experience and consciousness.
Russell Gray (Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History/University of Auckland)
Title: Neither a romantic nor a killjoy: some Bayesian thoughts about debates on animal minds.
Abstract: Debates in the study of animal cognition often oscillate between over-hyped claims of "human-like" cognitive abilities and deflationary "killjoy" accounts. In this talk I will argue that studies of cognitive evolution should follow studies of morphological complexity and seek incremental Darwinian accounts rather than postulating miraculous cognitive leaps. Our focus should therefore be on articulating what a theory intermediate cognition would look like, and developing powerful ways of testing specific intermediate cognitive mechanisms, rather than all-or-nothing claims about our pet species possessing some complex “human-like” ability. I will draw on the work of the philosophers Woodward and Sober in outlining some steps towards a Bayesian model comparison approach to animal cognition.
Andrea Griffin (University of Newcastle)
Title: Cognitive mechanisms of innovative problem solving in birds: Findings from a highly successful ecological invader
Abstract: Why do some species have larger brains than others? Do big brains confer greater intelligence? Do some environments select for greater intelligence? These questions underpin efforts to identify species differences in cognition, brains and ecology. Within this context, innovation -the ability to invent new behaviours, or use pre-existing ones in novel circumstances- has attracted increasing research interest in recent years. This surge of interest arose from macro-ecological analyses showing that innovation counts, the number of anecdotal reports of novel foraging behaviours per taxon, is positively correlated in both avian and primate taxa with the relative volume of multimodal integration areas broadly accepted to support higher order cognition. This finding forms the basis of the suggestion that innovation counts may offer a way forward to explore ecological conditions that select for enhanced information processing. We have been studying innovation in a highly successful invader, the common myna, using an experimental cross- and within-species comparative approach since 2010. I will present a body of empirical work that sheds light on the cognitive underpinnings of innovative problem solving in this invasive Passerine.
Dr. Brian Huss (York University)
Title: Type I and Type II Errors in Animal Cognition Research
Abstract: Anthropomorphism is the error of attributing certain characteristics to non-human animals when they do not in fact have those characteristics. Many people who work on animal cognition seem to think that it is an error to be avoided at all costs. One of those costs is likely to be anthropectomy (Gk. anthropos – human, ektomia – to cut out) – the error of denying that animals have certain characteristics when they do in fact have them. In a recently published paper, Kristin Andrews and I argue that (a) there is no reason to think that anthropomorphism is any more egregious than anthropectomy, and (b) the inclination to think otherwise is probably due to a failure to properly understand what is at epistemic stake in choosing the null hypothesis – the hypothesis that defines what counts as a Type I or Type II error. The epistemology of choosing the null hypothesis is discussed in this paper.
Dr. Alex Taylor (University of Auckland)
Title: The signature testing approach to the evolution of intelligence
Abstract: The evolution of intelligence is one of nature’s greatest mysteries. We have little idea how we came to be so clever, or even how our minds actually differ from those of other species. For over 100 years researchers have compared human and animal intelligence in order to gain insight into this area. However, these comparisons have been based on a “success-testing” approach, where researchers simply examine whether an animal can solve a problem or not. This approach has generated a great deal of debate, but little progress, because success-testing is flawed. Just because an animal solves a problem, it does not follow that the animal has used the same cognitive mechanisms as humans to do so. Inspired by Alan Turing’s work on machine intelligence, I will argue we need to adopt a novel “signature-testing” approach to avoid this problem. By searching for the signatures of cognitive mechanisms (their limits, errors and biases) it is possible to demonstrate whether a human and an animal truly think in the same way or not. I will outline how signature-testing can chart the evolution of intelligence and demonstrate its potential for three areas of comparative cognition: causal reasoning, mental time travel and metacognition.